Archive for import

How to lie twice to a President and succeed (13-VI-09)

Posted in 06 - Junio, Año 2009 with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on June 13, 2009 by Farid Matuk

Near three months ago, it was analyzed how the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank collude in order to show awesome GDP growth rates for Peruvian economy, in order to fulfill presidential fantasies of success, and now it is possible to witness how such collusion persists in order to show Peru as the country with the highest economic growth in Latin America, and one of the highest around the world.

Less than 2 weeks ago, in May 30th, the Ministry of Economy published the MMF (Multi-annual Macroeconomic Framework) for 2010-2012, which includes an economic forecast for 2009. Yesterday, the Central Bank published its quarterly report which includes also an economic forecast for 2009. As before, there is little difference on the GDP growth rate, 3.5% for one and 3.3% for the other, but this lucky coincidence is only good for providing presidential comfort, but behind those numbers two different worlds emerge.

The table below shows how the Ministry of Economy (ME) and the Central Bank (CB) evolve in its economic forecast, and also shows the gross differences on key indicators as elasticity between imports and GDP or export growth, which has impact on the ratio trade gap – GDP, as well on foreign currency reserve, and domestic currency convertibility.

 

Institution

Date of Issue GDP growth rate Import growth rate Export growth rate
ME May 28th ‘08 6.5% 12.6% 8.0%
CB Oct 24th ‘08 6.5% 9.0% 6.2%
CB Dec 17th ‘08 6.0% 7.3% 4.6%
ME Feb 2nd ‘09 5.0% 11.0% 5.4%
CB Feb 5th ‘09 5.0% 5.5% 3.4%
ME Feb 23rd ‘09 5.0% 13.5% 5.0%
CB Mar 21st ‘09 5.0% 2.1% 1.9%
ME May 30th 09 3.5% 1.3% -2.6%
CB Jun 12th 09 3.3% -4.7% -1.3%

  

Institution Date of Issue Elasticity Import – GDP Ratio Trade Gap – GDP
ME May 28th ‘08 1.9 4.8%
CB Oct 24th ‘08 1.4 4.4%
CB Dec 17th ‘08 1.2 4.3%
ME Feb 2nd ‘09 2.2 5.0%
CB Feb 5th ‘09 1.1 4.2%
ME Feb 23rd ‘09 2.7 5.7%
CB Mar 21st ‘09 0.4 3.7%
ME May 30th 09 0.4 2.4%
CB Jun 12th 09 -1.4 0.9%

 

As before, the elasticity between imports and GDP is a clear signal of two macroeconomic forecast structures forced to converge in a GDP growth of 3.3%-3.5%. While the Ministry of Economy finds a positive elasticity, the Central Bank finds a negative elasticity which is extremely uncommon in Peruvian economic history of the last 20 years; in particular to have a negative growth rate of imports.

Last circumstance Peru had a real reduction of imports was in 1999 due to a negative GDP growth in 1998. Previous similar experience was in 1988 and 1989, when Peru has the most disastrous economic experience becoming a member of the select group of countries with hyperinflation a la Cagan (more than 10,000% annual) with a GDP contraction of more than 20%.

While Ministry of Economy forecast could be seen as straightforward optimistic and unreal, at least it is possible to foresee a conventional macroeconomic model behind with coefficients making sense with experience. On the other side, the Central Bank model looks more as a two stage model, on the first stage realistic assumptions are made (as negative imports growth due to a recession) and in the second stage comfort outcome are imposed (positive GDP growth).

 In any case, Peruvian economic authorities had shown a clear behavior of common deception to the Presidency. Both of them show a positive GDP growth which goes against common sense but on synchrony with President Garcia flamboyancy. This deceptive behavior has been analyzed previously in “How to lie to a President and succeed”.

Advertisements

How to lie to a President and succeed (16-III-09)

Posted in 03 - Marzo, Año 2009 with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on March 16, 2009 by Farid Matuk

Peruvian economic authorities are two as in many countries, one in charge of fiscal policy and other in charge of monetary policy. As in many countries too, fiscal policy is in charge of a Minister, who is an appointee of the President; and monetary policy is in charge of the head of the Central Bank, who in Peru is choose by the Congress.

Until May 2008, both authorities had a point of agreement in economic policy and macroeconomic forecast, in a document called Multi-annual Macroeconomic Framework (Marco Macroeconómico Multianual), which is prepared by the Ministry of Economy and subscribed by the Central Bank, through an attached letter of acceptance.

Actual Peruvian president, hold the dubious record of producing the most lasting hyperinflation (Cagan definition) in Latin America, in his first tenure between 1985 and 1990, and this legacy hunts him.  At the beginning of the present economic crisis in 2008 he declared “Peru is insulated”, now he declares that Peru will be in top 5 world wide highest GDP growth for 2009, in an optimism that exudes maniac behavior.

But the world economic crisis has produced a hidden divorce in Peru economic authorities, in the process of trying to satisfy a President who believes that economic panic could be cured by hypnosis, the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank have build macroeconomic forecast based on presidential needs and not on technical criteria.

In the table below, is possible to see how the public documents from both institutions, available through Internet, document two different ways to fulfill a GDP growth rate out of reality. ME stands for Ministry of Economy and CB stands for Central Bank.

Institution

Date of Issue

GDP growth rate

Import growth rate

Export growth rate

ME

May 28th ‘08

6.5%

12.6%

8.0%

CB

Oct 24th ‘08

6.5%

9.0%

6.2%

CB

Dec 17th ‘08

6.0%

7.3%

4.6%

ME

Feb 2nd ‘09

5.0%

11.0%

5.4%

CB

Feb 5th ‘09

5.0%

5.5%

3.4%

ME

Feb 23rd ‘09

5.0%

13.5%

5.0%

CB

Mar 21st ‘09

5.0%

2.1%

1.9%

Institution

Date of Issue

Elasticity Import – GDP

Ratio Trade Gap – GDP

ME

May 28th ‘08

1.9

4.8%

CB

Oct 24th ‘08

1.4

4.4%

CB

Dec 17th ‘08

1.2

4.3%

ME

Feb 2nd ‘09

2.2

5.0%

CB

Feb 5th ‘09

1.1

4.2%

ME

Feb 23rd ‘09

2.7

5.7%

CB

Mar 21st ‘09

0.4

3.7%

Even today is March 16th, Central Bank web site link to its March document is dated March 21st, who know why. Going to substance, the column for GDP growth rate shows a reduction from 6.5% to 5.0% from May ’08 to Mar ’09; which looks as a shy reduction to many analysts but maybe Peru has a secret formula for growth.

The column for Import growth rate shows substantial differences between the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank, which is more evident in the column Elasticity Import – GDP. The Ministry of Economy has elasticity value that varies between 1.9 and 2.7, which fits with my own econometric estimations for this coefficient. But the Central Bank has an elasticity value that varies between 1.4 and 0.4 which is unrealistic from an econometric point of view, as well with historical data. Unless the Central Bank is planning a drastic change in its actual monetary policy, therefore the Peruvian currency will have a free fall enough large to reduce imports.

Finally, the last column shows the ratio for foreign trade and GDP, if May 2008 is taken as base line with financial markets willing to lend to emerging economies, actual circumstances imply a smaller gap since financial availability is lower than before for emerging markets. Also if terms of trade are constant, the baseline gap remains constant; but if there is deterioration of term of trade for Peru, then we have large gap; and today all analysis assumes deterioration for Peruvian terms of trade.

Assuming the Ministry of Economy export – GDP elasticity and the Central Bank export growth forecast, it is possible to simulate several scenarios. In order to reach the ratio for foreign trade and GDP of the base line, which is 4.8%, the maximum GDP growth rate feasible is 2.5%.

If foreign influx of capital is less than baseline scenario May 2008, and terms of trade deteriorated relative of baseline scenario May 2008, then GDP growth rate will be below 2.5%. From other analysis (in Spanish) made with short-term and medium-term real-sector economic cycle, the outcome is more grim with a GDP growth rate negative in 2010-Q1 of -1% (see “Fundiendo Motor” and “Compulsion a la Repeticion“).

Sat Apr 5, 2003 10:11 pm

Posted in 2003-04 Abril with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on January 28, 2009 by Farid Matuk

Activos y Flujos

Hoy tenemos en La República “… ¿nuestras exportaciones no
tradicionales (que son las que importan) podrán seguir creciendo con
una moneda nacional que se revalúa día a día? …” y “Sea lo que
fuere, es difícil pensar en un crecimiento sostenido de las
exportaciones no tradicionales si se mantiene o profundiza la
apreciación de nuestra moneda (precio relativo desfavorable). ¿Qué
es lo que viene sucediendo?”

Primero quisiera recordar un libro de Fair, quien es uno de los
pocos con un algoritmo propio para máxima verosimilitud, donde tiene
dos modelos simples para explicar valor agregado. Uno basado en
flujos donde el PBI depende de un componente de demanda exógeno, que
sería clasificado popularmente como keynesiano, y otro basado en
activos donde el PBI depende de un activo cualquiera, que sería
clasificado popularmente como monetarista.

En el pico de la hiperinflación, se discutía sobre las causas de
ésta, y básicamente había la de exceso de demanda interna (flujos) y
la de escasez de divisas (activos). Creo que similar enfoque se
puede aplicar al presente. O necesitamos un tipo de cambio real que
permita crecer via exportaciones no tradicionales (flujos) o
necesitamos un tipo de cambio real que permita crecer via
acumulación (activos).

La impresión que tengo esta sustentada en un mundo de activos,
donde la brecha entre las tasas de interés de soles y las tasas de
interés de dólares reflejan la devaluación esperada, pero
parafraseando a Beckett en “Esperando a Godot” la espera desespera y
la devaluación nunca llega, mientras el deseo que llegue se torna
desesperación.

Con un poco de tiempo y con la información detallada de la SBS,
se podría hacer el cálculo de la desesperación en 2002, es decir
cuanto fue la pérdida implícita de aquellos que ahorraron en dolares
y los que prestaron en dólares, versus la minoria que hizo las
mismas operaciones de activos en soles.

Un tema final sobre el tipo de cambio real, está en la
complejidad de construir los deflatores del comercio exterior de
bienes, ya que de servicios es sumamente dificultoso. Para
exportaciones suele ser mas fácil ya que estan mas concentradas pero
para un país con un fuerte componente de exportaciones primarias,
deflatar las exportaciones no primarias es titánico. Pero
importaciones tambien suele ser un problema ya que se tienen dos
soluciones básicas, o se deflata con algún índice de precios del
socio comercial o se se enfrenta la díficil tarea de construir un
índice de volumen de las importaciones.

Farid Matuk 

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MacroPeru/message/2747